


3 MEDIEVAL PERSONAL UNIONS RELATING TO THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY



separate chancellery for Croatia, the function of the viceroy (ban) of Dalmatia and Croatia was sometimes merged with, sometimes separated from that of Slavonia. The Hungarian kings, however, retained Croatian customary law and did not grant estates to Hungarian nobles in Croatia. The Croatian-Hungarian personal union was created when the Croatian Trpimirović dynasty died out and a part of the Croatian nobility, encouraged by Helena, the widow of the Croatian king, invited the Hungarian King Ladislaus I to the throne. Later unions can indeed be understood as personal unions **XI.1.3.** The Hungarian kings did not modify the internal structure of Poland, which *King Louis the Great* (1342–1382, **2**) had acquired in 1370, nor did the Poles with Hungary between 1440 and 1444. The German-Hungarian unions created by King Sigismund **3** did not survive the death of his successor, King Albert. The duration of the Bohemian-Hungarian union is a matter of perspective. Those who regarded Ladislaus V as king of Hungary from 1440, accepted the union of the Bohemian and Hungarian thrones, but who accepted Vladislaus I, considered it as having ceased with the death of Albert and recognized the joint government of the two countries by a common ruler only after the actual accession of Ladislaus V, that is from 1452 onwards. Hungary only entered into a personal union with Aus-



2 Louis the Great, King of Hungary and Poland

tria under King Albert of Habsburg (1437–1439), but after that it was as doubtful as the Bohemian union until 1452. The death of Ladislaus V (1457) terminated the common government with Austria until 1526, but the one with Bohemia was soon revived. The Catholic tributary provinces of the Czech crown, Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia, elected Matthias Corvinus (1458–1590, **4**) king in 1469. From then on, he held the title of King of Bohemia, but he never succeeded in bringing that country under his rule. Matthias Corvinus conquered significant parts of Lower Austria and Styria and he took the title of Duke of Austria in 1487, but this was no more than armed conquest, which ceased after the death of the king. Most of the countries included in the full title of the Hungarian kings were not under the control of the Hungarian monarchs. Therefore, there was no personal union with Rama (Bosnia), Serbia, Cumania (Moldova and Wallachia), Galicia, Lodomeria and Bulgaria.

The kings of Hungary did not have their own residence in Croatia. They went there for war-related purposes only. Croatian affairs were handled by the viceroys (bans), who were mostly based in the city of Knin. During his Polish reign, King Louis the Great made only three trips to Poland, while others governed the country instead of him. King Sigismund spent much of his time in the Holy Roman Empire. He made Pozsony (Pressburg) his second capital because it was easier to reach from the Empire than Buda. Vladislaus I did not return to Poland after his coronation as king of Hungary (1440) and left the country only for two campaigns against the Ottomans. Ladislaus V held his court in his countries alternately. In the last years of his life, King Matthias Corvinus governed his countries from Vienna. Vladislaus II and Louis II stayed predominantly in Hungary and handled Bohemian affairs from Buda. Neither of them created common imperial bodies. There were no common financial or military authorities, no common taxes and no common army for their countries.



3 Sigismund, King of Hungary, Germany and Bohemia and Holy Roman Emperor



4 King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary

The Eastern Hungarian Kingdom (1526–1570) and the Principality of Transylvania (1570–1690) Historians still debate to this day to what extent the Principality of Transylvania can be considered an independent state. Since it had its own territory, population, ruler and administration, and was internationally recognised, it can be considered partly independent. Moreover, it played a major role in preserving Hungarian national culture and the idea of national kingdom and sovereignty.

The internal battles following the dual election of John Szapolyai (John I), the Voivode of Transylvania and Ferdinand I (Habsburg) to the Hungarian throne at the end of 1526, reduced the rule of John I, who sought a French and then an Ottoman ally, to the eastern regions of Hungary. Despite the *Treaty of Várad* (1538) with Ferdinand I, the infant son of John I, John Sigismund was also elected king of Hungary after the death of his father in 1540. This perpetuated the *division of the Kingdom of Hungary* into two, and then, after the Ottoman conquest in the early 1540s, into three parts, although both the *Habsburgs* and the *Szapolyais* wanted the country to be unified. In the *Treaty of Speyer* (1570), John Sigismund renounced his title of elected king of Hungary. At the same time, in addition to the historical Transylvania, he was also allowed to possess parts of Eastern Hungary (Partium). He would also have been eligible for the title of prince, but he died four days after the ratification of this treaty, and only his successor, Stephen Báthory made use of it after his election as king of Poland and as grand duke of Lithuania in 1575.

The legitimization of the Principality of Transylvania was based on the Polish kingdom of *Stephen Báthory* (1533–1586, **5**), since the *Polish-Lithuanian state*, with which *Transylvania* was in a *personal union*, was a major European power at the time, respected by both the *Habsburgs* and the *Ottomans*. As a result, the international role of Transylvania increased significantly. During the reign of Prince Stephen Báthory, Transylvania was no longer considered a vassal state of the Ottomans, and this remained the case for most of the subsequent princes (in contrast to, for example, Wallachia and Moldova). Its international recognition is

shown by the fact that it was treated as an equal party in peace agreements, such as the *Treaty of Westphalia* (1648), to which Transylvania was a signatory, playing a key role in the birth of modern Europe. This was a clear proof that *European states regarded Transylvania as a separate entity*. The wives of Stephen Báthory and his nephew Sigismund, as well as that of Gabriel Bethlen, were descended from well-known foreign dynasties. Moreover, the guardian of Michael Apafi II was William of Orange King of England, what is a further testimony to the sovereignty of Transylvania.

The Principality's *foreign policy*, which could be influenced by the prince's advisors and the Diets as well, was based on *loyalty to the Ottomans and good relations with Christian countries*, including the Habsburg Empire. This dichotomy was also reflected in the fact that *the Habsburgs claimed Transylvania by right of the King of Hungary*, while the *Turks considered it a tax-paying vassal*. In this situation, the ability to 'dance hogtied', to skilfully manoeuvre between the two great powers, paid off. However, the semi-independent existence of the Principality created by the Ottoman conquest seemed unjustified after the expulsion of the Turks. Therefore, it continued to exist in a completely different form after 1690: within the Habsburg Empire, but as an entity more or less separated from Hungary.

Stephen Báthory envisioned a confederation of Poland, Hungary, Transylvania and the Romanian voivodeships to repel the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, but his death in 1586 prevented the realization of his far-reaching plan.

Transylvania entered the *Fifteen Years War* (1591–1606) against the Ottomans *on the side of the Habsburgs and Venice* (joining the Holy League in 1595), but this almost led to the downfall of the Principality and caused permanent internal political battles as well as temporary Habsburg and Wallachian rule. This confused situation was ended by the *anti-Habsburg uprising of Stephen Bocskai* (1604–1605), who had previously been pro-Habsburg. *As elected prince of Hungary and Transylvania in 1605*, Bocskai also secured the rights of the Hungarian estates of the realm as well as religious freedom in the *Peace Agreement of Vienna* signed with King Rudolf I in June 1606. In addition, he enlarged Transylvania with significant areas in the Partium territory. This made it possible for Rudolf to end the Fifteen Years War in November of that year with the *Peace Treaty of Zsitvatorok*, signed by the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, with Transylvania as an equal party, through the mediation of Bocskai.


After the reign of Gabriel Báthory, which recalled the turbulent first years of the 1600s, *the rule of Prince Gabriel Bethlen* (1613–1629, **6**) meant not only the rapid development of Transylvania's economy and culture, its 'golden age', but also the joining of Western European coalitions backed by his Ottoman ally against the Habsburgs, and the establishment of strong relations with the Protestant powers **XI.1.4.** The independ-



5 Stephen Báthory, Prince of Transylvania, King of Poland



6 Gabriel Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania, King of Hungary



ence of Transylvania that participated in the *Thirty Years War* (1618–1648) as a belligerent party, primarily in order to secure religious freedom for Hungarian Protestants, was recognised by the leading powers of the time, including the Netherlands, England, Sweden and Venice. While Bethlen became *prince and king of Hungary* (1620–1621), the Ottoman Empire repeatedly waived the payment of the annual tax, which again proved the *almost complete independence* of Transylvania that, in addition to permanent envoys, also sent ad hoc representatives abroad. Bethlen and his successors believed that the Habsburgs threatened the relative independence of Transylvania and were unable to defend it against the Ottomans, while the Turks, if the Transylvanians played their politics well, would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Principality.

This attitude changed during the reign of *George II Rákóczi* (1648–1660), when he attempted to seize the Polish throne (1657). Since a Polish-Transylvanian union would have harmed Ottoman interests, the Ottoman Empire responded to the prince's campaign by *occupying Transylvania*.

The reign of *Michael Apafi* (1661–1690) was again characterized by rebalancing between the two powers. Apafi (initially in secret) joined the new *Holy League against the Ottomans* and broke with the Turkish alliance in the end, but supported anti-Habsburg movements in Hungary, too. His main objective was to gain international recognition for the Principality after the expulsion of the Ottomans, but he failed to achieve this. Transylvania became a province of the Habsburgs by the *Diploma Leopoldinum* (1690), and the *Treaty of Karlowitz* (1699) no longer mentioned it as a separate entity. Attempts to regain sovereignty were unsuccessful, and although *Francis II Rákóczi* was elected prince (1704), Transylvania, largely in the hands of the Habsburgs, had no independence in his state any more.

In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918) Following the election of two kings after the defeat by the Ottoman troops at Mohács (1526), the Hungarian state was divided into two and then, after the Ottoman conquest of Buda (1541), three parts (Habsburg Hun-

gary, Ottoman Hungary, Eastern Hungarian/Transylvanian state). From 1570, the eastern part of the country (Transylvania) was organized as a principality under Ottoman control, but its princes (and the Habsburg rulers) considered this part of the country under their administration as an inalienable part of the Hungarian Holy Crown. The maintenance of the border-fortress system against the Ottomans and, after the unsuccessful Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, the recapture of Buda (1686) and the expulsion of the Ottomans from Hungary were mainly achieved with the help of the Habsburgs.


Although Hungary was the most independent entity within the Habsburg Empire, the history of the Habsburg-Hungarian relationship in the 17th and 18th centuries, full of quarrels and reconciliations, never allowed for true independence and the establishment of its own foreign policy. This was not possible even after the international isolation of the Empire in the mid-19th century and the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867. Hungary had to subordinate itself to the interests of the federal state, which was considered a great power, the other half of which was made up of the hereditary lands of Austria.

A peculiar structure was created in this way. Joint (k.u.k., kaiserlich und königlich/imperial and royal) ministries for military and foreign affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were established and a third one for financing those two, all of them with headquarters in Vienna. There was some scope for enforcing Hungarian aspects in them, because either the common finance minister or the common war minister always had to be Hungarian, but both could not be Hungarian at the same time. The leadership of the joint Ministry of Finance was dominated by Hungarians, and there were several Hungarians among the joint foreign ministers, from *Gyula Andrássy Srn.* **7** – who unsuccessfully sought in 1849 to gain foreign support for the Hungarian War of Independence as a diplomatic envoy in Constantinople, London and Paris – through *Gusztáv Kálnoky*, *István Burján* and *Gyula Andrássy Jrn.* Many Hungarians worked at the headquarters of the office at Ballhausplatz (see **XI.1.5.** for the embassies of the Monarchy). However, the lack of



7 Gyula Andrássy Srn., Hungarian Prime Minister, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister

5 EMBASSIES OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY IN 1913



independent foreign missions limited the international political orientation and networking of the Hungarian political elite. Moreover, it did not allow the country to build its image abroad, which was to take its toll later.

The activities of *Gyula Andrássy Sr.* as foreign minister between 1871 and 1879, also through his excellent relations with the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck, determined the foreign policy of the Monarchy, too. As the Ottoman Empire shrank, the orientation of the small Balkan states became increasingly important. Although the Monarchy wished to maintain good relations with Russia, it did not want to cede this territory entirely to Russian interests. In addition, it also intended to prevent Serbia and Romania from claiming territories of the Monarchy (mainly Hungary) inhabited by ethnic Serbs and Romanians. The Berlin Congress of 1878, attended by representatives of the great powers (Great Britain, France, the Russian Em-

pire, the German Empire, Italy) as well as the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan nations, prevented further Russian expansion and foreshadowed the formation of the later alliance systems. The Monarchy got the opportunity to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Benjamin Kállay, Austro-Hungarian minister of finance and Lajos Thallóczy played a key role in the modernization of the region that was annexed by the Monarchy in 1908 and came under the administration of the joint Ministry of Finance.

As Russia opposed the Berlin settlement, the Monarchy concluded an anti-Russian agreement with the German Empire (Dual Alliance) in 1879 during Andrássy's ministership, joined by Italy (Triple Alliance) in 1882 and secretly by Romania in 1883. Although the League of the Three Emperors (Russian, German and Austrian) concluded in 1873 continued, the Monarchy and Germany's relations with Russia deteriorat-


ed from the mid-1880s, mainly because of the Balkan conflict of 1885, and were replaced by a Russian rapprochement to France. The Monarchy's position as a great power weakened. Its ally, the German Empire, became the world's leading economic and scientific power, but Britain and France were also in a stronger position on the international stage.

The Monarchy signed a treaty with Russia in 1897 (replaced by a neutrality agreement in 1904), which ensured respect for the status quo in and the interests related to the Balkans. However, the renewed Balkan conflicts at the beginning of the 20th century, Serbia's increasing anti-Monarchy attitude, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the two Balkan wars (1912–1913) finally soured their relations. Meanwhile, a pact between Britain and France in 1904 and then between Russia and Britain in 1907 led to the formation of the alliance known as the Entente, thus creating the power groupings that were the opposing sides in World War I (XI. 1. 6.).

Italy and Romania, which had previously been allies of the Monarchy, were neutral in the beginning but they entered the world war in 1915 and 1916 respectively on the side of the Entente with the promise of satisfying their territorial claims. However, it was not this fact but the declaration of war by the USA (1917) that decided the final outcome of the conflict. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918), signed in 1918 after the collapse of Russia, and the Peace of Bucharest (7 May 1918), signed with Romania, made the victory of the Central Powers likely. However, the struggle of the belligerents, economically exhausted by 1917 and struggling with internal discontent, was decided in favour of the Entente by the American intervention.

Peace attempts in 1917 and 1918 by the last ruler of the Monarchy, Charles I (as the Emperor of Austria), failed. The collapse of the dualist state at the end of October and beginning of November 1918 also meant the break-up of the former great power, the partition of almost two-thirds of its former territory among several successor states and the tearing apart of Hungary. The occupation of the northern, eastern and southern

6 ALLIANCES IN EUROPE (1873–1913)



7 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES OF HUNGARY (1920–1944)*

Name of the treaty	Type and date	Act and/or entry into force
Hungarian–Entente allies (Trianon)	Peace – 4 June 1920	1921: Act XXIII 26 July 1921
Hungarian–USA	Peace – 29 August 1921	1921: Act XLVIII 17 December 1921
Hungarian–Austrian (Venice Agreement)	Border – 13 October 1921	—
Hungary–League of Nations	Multilateral – 18 September 1922	1923: Act XII
Hungarian–Turkish	Friendship – 18 December 1923	1924: Act XVI 4 April 1924
Hungarian–Austrian (Baden Convention)	Cultural – 28 May 1926	1 January 1927
Hungarian–Italian	Friendship – 5 April 1927	1927: Act XXVIII 8 August 1927
Hungarian–Austrian (Venice Agreement)	Cultural – 27 November 1932	27 February 1933
Hungarian–Italian–Austrian	Multilateral – 17 March 1934	12 July 1934
Hungarian–Polish	Cultural – 21 October 1934	1935: Act XXVII 13 August 1935
Hungarian–Italian	Cultural – 16 February 1935	1935: Act XXVIII 23 August 1935
Hungarian–Austrian	Cultural – 4 March 1935	1935: Act XIX 23 August 1935
Hungarian–German	Cultural – 28 May 1936	1937: Act V 3 April 1937
Hungarian–Estonian	Cultural – 13 October 1937	1938: Act XXIII 10 June 1938
Hungarian–Finnish	Cultural – 22 October 1937	1938: Act XXIX 28 June 1938
Hungarian–Japanese	Cultural – 15 November 1938	1940: Act I 20 December 1939
Hungarian–Iraqi	Friendship – 2 November 1938	1940: Act XXXII 26 October 1940.
Hungarian–Afghan	Friendship – 25 August 1934	1940: Act XXXIII 24 October 1940
Hungarian–German	Cultural – 13 March 1940	1940: Act XXXIV 16 November 1940
Hungary–Tripartite Pact	Multilateral – 20 November 1940	1941: Act I 20 November 1940
Hungarian–Yugoslav	Friendship – 12 December 1940	1941: Act II 27 February 1941
Hungarian–Bulgarian	Cultural – 18 February 1941	1941: Act XVI 16 October 1941

*Excluding foreign cultural policy without sectoral agreements

territories of the Kingdom of Hungary by Serbian, Czech and Romanian troops began in November 1918. In addition, its western territories were claimed by Austria, which had suffered similar losses.

The Hungarian state independent again (1918–1944)

Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period was determined by the defeat in the WWI, the partition of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including Hungary in autumn 1918 and the *Treaty of Trianon* signed as a consequence on 4 June 1920. Trianon's provisions, which were extremely strict and included humiliating territorial, economic and political conditions for Hungary, were perceived as a dictate and had wide-ranging effects. Hungary became an independent state again


for the first time since 1526, allowing it to pursue an independent foreign policy and build up its own foreign affairs apparatus. However, this process, which had already begun in November 1918 (XI. 1. 7.), was achieved at a price that Hungarian politicians and parties were not ready to accept. This made the demand for a *revision of the peace terms* a common political aspiration in Hungary. Minor debates emerged only about the extent to which it should be: complete or partial (meaning the fairest possible from an ethnic point of view). The room for manoeuvre in Hungary's foreign policy remained extremely limited. With the exception of Austria, initially not benevolently neutral, Hungary was surrounded by 'victorious' states – *Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* – that signed treaties with each other to establish the

Little Entente by summer 1921, which had an explicitly anti-Hungarian aim and was created to prevent territorial revision. Until the second half of the 1920s, this tight grip severely limited Hungary's diplomatic options and made it impossible to promote and demand the need for revision in the international arena.

Nevertheless, Hungarian foreign policy achieved some minor successes. The *Treaty of Venice*, signed with Italian mediation on 13 October 1921, made it possible for Sopron, the centre of Western Hungary, given to Austria by the peace treaties and eight surrounding settlements to hold a *plebiscite* on whether to remain in Hungary or to join Austria. This ended in a convincing Hungarian victory on 14–16 December 1921, and a small area, inhabited mainly by a German-speaking population, was returned to Hungary. A decision was taken in September 1922 to admit Hungary as a member of the *League of Nations*, an international organization established after the Great War. This forum provided an opportunity for representatives of Hungary to speak out about the injustices of Trianon – especially by highlighting the plight of Hungarians living beyond the new borders in the Carpathian Basin. With the help of this organization, Hungary received an international loan in 1924 that contributed greatly and faster than expected to its economic recovery and thus to its political consolidation. In that year, Hungary established *diplomatic relations* with 30 countries (40 by 1937), not only in Central Europe (e.g. Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Poland) as in 1918–1919, but also with countries on distant continents (e.g. Japan, USA 1921, Brazil 1923, Argentina 1924, Mexico 1926, Egypt 1928, Iran 1937) (XI. 1. 8.).


Another modern instrument for breaking out of international isolation was *cultural foreign policy*. By establishing *Collegium Hungaricum*s and awarding scholarships abroad, the government helped to educate an elite able to succeed in international environment and to present the values of Hungarian culture abroad, thus improving its international recognition. The Collegiums of Vienna (1924), Berlin (1924) and Rome (1927) as well as their equivalent in Paris (1927) served elite

8 LEGATIONS OF HUNGARY IN 1937







8 Kuno Klebelsberg, Minister for Religion and Education



9 István Bethlen, Prime Minister



10 Kálmán Kánya, Minister of Foreign Affairs



11 The Foreign Ministry building in 1936

political and economic links with each other, partly as a grouping against the Nazi German Reich.

In the same year Hungary established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On 12 March 1938, Germany, which was gaining a stronger foothold in Europe, annexed Austria, making itself Hungary's immediate neighbour. As everyone in Hungary desired a revision of the Trianon Treaty, and only Germany supported this beside Italy, Hungary moved closer and closer to the foreign policy of the Third Reich, but even then it tried to preserve as much of its independence as possible. This was indicated by the fact that the Hungarian delegation led by regent Miklós Horthy and prime minister Béla Imrédy, visiting Germany in August 1938, refused Hitler's provocative offer to play a role in dismantling Czechoslovakia by attacking the former Hungarian part of its northern neighbour. In addition, it was at this time that a treaty was signed in Bled with the Little Entente states, which guaranteed equal rights to Hungary in the field of armaments in exchange for Budapest's renunciation of retaking its lost territories by force. This effectively meant the end of the Little Entente. Furthermore, immediately after the outbreak of WWII in 1939, Hungary refused to allow rail cargoes to pass through the country to help Germany in its war against Poland. In addition, Hungary took in tens of thousands of Polish refugees and provided some of them with new provisional homes.

While the successes of the territorial revision (the southern, mostly Hungarian inhabited parts of Slovakia and Subcarpathia [today in Ukraine] in 1938; the remaining parts of Subcarpathia in 1939; Northern Transylvania [today in Romania] in 1940; the partial return of the former Hungarian parts of Yugoslavia



12 German occupiers in Buda Castle, March 1944

in 1941) were welcomed with great enthusiasm in Hungary, they implied a greater commitment to the German Reich. This was demonstrated by Hungary's accession to the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan in November 1940.

The Italian orientation gradually changed to a German one from 1938 onwards. Although Hungarian foreign policy (at least in part) sought to escape from this mortal grip, also demonstrated by the attempted rapprochement to Yugoslavia in 1940–1941, there remained little chance of achieving this. During the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia, Hungary came into increasing conflict with the Anglo-Saxon powers over its reconquest of parts of the historic Hungarian southern areas and was forced to enter WWII as a belligerent in June 1941, when the Soviet Union was attacked.

It was difficult to find a way out of this situation and the increasing German pressure. Miklós Kállay's government did contact the Western powers. Nevertheless, by early 1944 it became clear that Soviet troops, not the Western ones, would arrive in Hungary.

On 19 March 1944, the German Reich invaded Hungary, the 'reluctant vassal', and the country's independence was thus terminated [12]. The same year, on 15 October, regent Miklós Horthy, who remained in power, sought to make peace with the Soviet Union in a poorly prepared 'breakaway attempt'. However, after this failed, the far-right took power, led by Ferenc Szálasi. In close collaboration with the occupying Germans, they remained with the Third Reich to the end, while Hungary was occupied by Soviet troops (with a small number of Romanian and Bulgarian ones). This brought Hungary – deprived of its independence once again – into the sphere of interest and influence of the Soviet Union for over 40 years.

The Hungarian state under occupation and in Soviet dependence (1944–1990)

The German occupation of Hungary in 1944 ended the country's sovereignty and with it the legitimacy of Hungarian diplomacy and the continued operation of the network of foreign representations. Hungary came de jure under the control of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) in 1945, and de facto under the rule of the Soviet Union, which fully affected foreign relations as well. The new system that was taking shape did not, apart from briefly, require the further services of the Hungarian diplomatic corps, outstanding even by international standards, including those diplomats who had resigned earlier in protest against the German occupation. As soon as the war ended, the replacement of the entire foreign service staff began, based on class and ideological considerations, with people who did not have the diplomatic skills and experience that would have been indispensable for the proper representation of Hungarian interests in this crucial period. Thus, Hungary participated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1946–47 with a complete lack of capable diplomats, which – not surprisingly, considering the circumstances

mentioned above – ended up in Hungarian historical memory as the Second Trianon.

In addition to personnel changes, the reorganization of the network of missions abroad and the appointment of heads of mission also began, within the constraints imposed by the ACC and the limited financial resources. Understandably, priority was given to the capitals of the victorious powers (Moscow, Washington, London, Paris) and the neighbouring countries (Prague, Bucharest, Belgrade, Vienna) [XI. 1. 10.]. After the descent of the Iron Curtain (1948), the 'sovietization' of Hungary, and thus of Hungarian diplomacy accelerated. The frameworks established in this period, which, with certain shifts of emphasis, defined the operational conditions and priorities of Hungarian diplomacy until the regime change in 1989. Among these, the first and most important turn was the complete subordination of Hungarian foreign policy to the direction and interests of the Soviet Union. Hungarian diplomacy thus became for many decades the executor of instructions and guidelines from Moscow, with minimal possibility of following real national interests.

This was the time when the dual structure of foreign administration was established in Hungary, which was also typical of other states in the Soviet bloc. This meant that the competent body of the state party (Hungarian Hungarian Workers' Party, MDP, and, from 1956 onwards, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, MSZMP) became the controller of foreign policy within the country, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played the role of a subordinate executive. It was also at this time that the strong link between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the intelligence/counter-intelligence departments of the Ministry of the Interior was established, which, like in other communist countries, was to remain a feature of the whole period. A huge squad of agents operated in Hungarian missions under diplomatic cover, mostly performing consular duties, or in the capacity of press attachés or political counsellors.

In addition to serving Soviet foreign policy, other priorities can also be observed in the activities of Hungarian diplomacy during the Cold War. One of the most important of them was the observation of Hungarian emigrants living in the West and, to a lesser extent, in certain countries of Latin America, who were considered a potential threat to the communist regime. Therefore, there were plenty of attempts to divide, subvert or otherwise manipulate them. This activity became particularly intensive after the defeat of the 1956 revolution. At that time, large numbers of refugees, strongly opposed to communist rule in Hungary, appeared in Western countries. Many of them – because of their high professional qualifications – could expect a prominent social position in their host countries and could therefore seriously impede the acceptance of the post-1956 consolidation of the Hungarian communist regime in the West. Therefore, they had to be watched!

During the Cold War era, the economic and technological backwardness of the communist countries, in-



13 Prime Minister András Hegedűs signs Hungary's accession to the Warsaw Pact (14 May 1955)

cluding Hungary, from the West gradually became more and more apparent, seriously threatening the long-term sustainability of the system. The tasks of Hungarian diplomacy therefore increasingly included the stimulation of economic cooperation with certain Western countries – with a view to obtaining 'hard currency'. Another priority was to strengthen scientific-technological cooperation in order to find loopholes in the so-called COCOM list to prevent the export of high-tech products to communist countries.

By the mid-1950s, Hungary's integration into the communist bloc was complete, both economically and in military-political terms. Hungary joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955 [XI. 1. 11.]. [13] At the same time, the network of Hungarian foreign missions was constantly expanding, not only in Europe, but also in other regions where this seemed justified for ideological (Beijing 1949, Pyongyang 1949, Ulaanbaatar 1957) or other reasons (Cairo 1947, Tel Aviv 1950, Buenos Aires 1949). Hungary's admission to the UN in 1955 significantly increased the prestige of Hungarian diplomacy, but it definitely did not mean a relaxation of Soviet control.

The effectiveness of Hungarian diplomacy after 1945 and in the 1950s was continuously hampered by a severe lack of properly trained, experienced, and foreign language-speaking professionals. As a consequence of the continuous reorganizations, personnel changes and ideological purges that took place throughout this period, by the end of the 1950s the professional level of the Hungarian diplomatic corps was not even close to the standards it represented at the onset of WW II. The waves of repression and cleansing that followed the 1956 revolution only exacerbated this situation. However, it was precisely at this time that the regime would have had the greatest need for reliable diplomats who could speak foreign languages and were able to interact in an international environment, in order to help the system of János Kádár gain acceptance in the western world. The party leadership saw the solution in a significant increase of the number of intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover, especially in missions operating in the West. The success of this policy was finally confirmed by the fact that in 1963, albeit with significant help by the Soviets, the matter of the reprisals following the 1956 Hungarian revolution, known as the 'Hungarian issue', which was considered the main external obstacle to the communist consolidation, was removed from the agenda of the UN.

By the mid-1960s, Hungary's European relations and the network of its foreign representation was largely in place in both the East and the West. In the decades that followed, Hungarian diplomacy became increasingly pragmatic, facilitated by the détente that began with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. In addition, the role of economic considerations compared to political aspects in the opening of diplomatic missions abroad, continued to grow. A good example is Australia, with which Hungary did not even have diplomatic relations in the mid-1960s due to ideological and political differences, but a Hungarian commercial office was operating in Sydney. Hungary established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in similar endeavours in 1973 and opened an embassy in Bonn in 1974, although a Hungarian trade mission in Frankfurt had been operating since the late 1940s. Even more telling is the evolution of Hungary's relations with Spain. In Europe at the time, a more fierce enemy for a communist country could hardly be found than Franco, but despite this, the two sides opened a consular and trade mission in each other's capitals as early as 1970, five years prior to the dictator's death. All this

education very effectively and continue to operate with some interruption to the present day, now primarily for the purpose of cultural outreach [XI. 1. 9.]. In addition, Kuno Klebelsberg (1875–1932) [8] and Bálint Hóman (1885–1951), the leading figures of cultural policy, did much to promote the image of Hungary abroad by supporting departments for Hungarian studies and guest lecturers at foreign universities.


Hungary concluded very interesting and internationally unprecedented agreements with Austria on the partial sharing of the former 'common' archival, museum and library stocks and on their classification as the 'common intellectual property' of the two countries (Baden Convention, 1927; Treaty of Venice, 1932). Starting from the mid-1930s, bilateral agreements on 'intellectual cooperation' in education, culture and science marked the growing importance of cultural diplomacy [XI. 1. 7.], [XI. 1. 9.].

The course of Hungarian foreign policy in the 1920s

was set by prime minister István Bethlen (1921–1931) [9], while that of the 1930s was marked by one of the most talented Hungarian diplomats, Kálmán Kánya, who served as minister of foreign affairs from 1933 to 1938 [10] [11].

The decisive change in the political field was the friendship treaty with Italy signed in April 1927, which resulted in an increase in Hungary's international prestige. With a victorious, rising power in the rear, Hungary was able to articulate its foreign policy plans and goals in international fora much more freely than before, including the desire for territorial revision. This was also supported by the formation of pro-Hungarian groups in the parliaments of the great powers, which proposed a partial correction of the Trianon Peace Treaty, as reflected in Lord Rothermere's press campaign launched in 1927.

With the signing of the Rome Protocols in March 1934, Hungary, Italy and Austria strengthened their



12 HUNGARY'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN 2023



only with the socialist countries of the continent (China, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia). In the mid-1960s, Hungarian missions were also operating in India, Indonesia, Japan, Burma (now Myanmar) and Iran. By the end of the 1970s, the number of Hungarian embassies in Asia rose to 13.

Signs of the *decline of the communist system* gradually became apparent worldwide in the 1980s, accelerated by economic stagnation and then by worsening global economic conditions. This was also felt in Hungarian diplomacy. The *rapidly deteriorating economic situation* of Hungary led to a *contraction of the network of missions*, which had been expanding until then. The budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was significantly reduced and the devaluation of the Hungarian forint in 1987 caused further serious difficulties. In the same year, the decision was taken to close the Hungarian embassies in Accra, Conakry, La Paz and Nairobi, as well as the representation at UNESCO in Paris. At the beginning of 1989, there were 65 Hungarian embassies and 12 consular missions in 171 countries around the world. This was hardly more than two decades earlier. Compared to the mounting difficulties, it was a small consolation that – due to much improved training conditions and a more reasonable personnel policy – Hungarian diplomacy paradoxically reached the peak of



14 Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock and Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn cut the Iron Curtain on the Austro-Hungarian border (27 June 1989)

its professional performance in the 1980s, the period of decline. The changes initiated by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union also increased the scope of Hungarian foreign policy. This made it possible for Hungary – as the first state in the Soviet bloc – to sign an *agreement on trade, commercial and economic cooperation* with the *European Community* in 1988, which brought significant economic benefits and meant the establishment of diplomatic relations, too. The imminent end of the era of Soviet dependence was heralded in Hungarian diplomacy by events such as the resumption of relations with Israel in 1988, which had been severed in 1967, and with the Republic of Korea in 1989. And the symbolic final act of this process was the moment when the *Hungarian and Austrian foreign ministers cut the Iron Curtain* on 27 June 1989 [14].

Diplomatic relations of Hungary after 1990

As a consequence of the *regime change in 1990*, Hungary's international relations and the network of its missions were restructured. József Antall, the first freely elected prime minister of Hungary after the fall of the Iron Curtain, set *three new strategic directions* for Hungarian foreign policy: *Euro-Atlantic integration* (i.e. achieving membership in NATO and the EU), the *transformation of Hungary's relations with Central Europe*, and – as prime minister of 15 million ethnic Hungarians in spirit – the *settlement of relations with ethnic Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders*. This *strategic shift in foreign policy* and the geopolitical transformation of Central and Eastern Europe led to a transformation of Hungary's foreign representation system as well. In Hungary's neighbourhood, *Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union broke up* and were replaced by 22 new states in the 1990s. Hungary established diplomatic relations with these countries, opening new embassies in several capitals



15 The main building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade


such as Almaty, Baku, Kyiv, Chişinău, Ljubljana, Bratislava, Sarajevo, Skopje and Zagreb. As a result of the new national policy, meaning the policy towards Hungarian communities abroad, consular missions were opened in several cities of the Carpathian Basin [XI. 1. 12].

As an important milestone in the normalization of relations with the West, the government of Miklós Németh, the last prime minister before the fall of the Iron Curtain, signed a treaty with the *Holy See* on 9 February 1990 on the complete resumption of diplomatic relations. The Antall government opened consulates general in Barcelona, Los Angeles, Milan, Munich, Toronto and São Paulo as part of the restructuring of the foreign missions system. Hungary joined the *Council of Europe* in 1990 with a permanent representation in Strasbourg, *NATO* in 1999 and the *European Union*



16 A salon of the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna

13 ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE IN 2024



17 Hungarian Academy in Rome

in 2004 [XI. 1. 13]. The two latter permanent representations are based in Brussels.

The *network of honorary consuls*, known for centuries in diplomacy but rejected by the Communist countries for decades, was revived in 1990. Honorary consuls are generally citizens of the host state who, for some reason (emotional or spiritual attachment, national identity, economic interest or prestige), are ready to represent the sending state as consul and to foster and develop economic, cultural and other relations between the sending and host states. In spring 2023, 272 honorary consuls were assisting in building Hungary's international relations.

2014 saw a new turn in Hungary's foreign policy, with a *strong emphasis on foreign trade*. This shift of emphasis was reflected in the new name of the Ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, [16]) and the *significant expansion of the network of missions abroad* [XI. 1. 12]. Embassies have been opened in Chile, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, Colombia, Oman, Peru, Uzbekistan, as well as consulates in Lendava/Alsólendva,

Banská Bystrica, Chicago, Düsseldorf, Gdańsk, Houston, Kazan, Innsbruck, Miami, Stuttgart and Wrocław.

Hungarian cultural institutes represent a special network of diplomatic relations. In spring 2023, cultural institutes served the promotion of Hungarian culture in 26 cities and the creation and preservation of a favourable image of the country.

Hungary's missions operate everywhere in offices and buildings appropriate to their tasks and functions. Some of them are owned by the Hungarian state. The two most valuable buildings in this network are the Embassy in Vienna [16] and the Hungarian Academy in Rome (Falconieri Palace) [17].

Europe

The radical transformations that followed the regime change in 1990 were perhaps most clearly reflected in Hungary's European relations. With the end of the era of dependence from the Soviet Union and the regaining of sovereignty, the *room for manoeuvre of Hungarian diplomacy widened*. Favourable conditions have been achieved by *Hungary's pioneer role in dismantling the Communist system in Europe, creating considerable moral and political capital for the country*. Relations with Germany, which have always been of strategic importance to Hungary, were significantly strengthened by opening Hungary's western border to refugees from the GDR, the 'Communist Germany'. However, the transition in Hungary's geographical environment has often been accompanied by a number of dangers in the form of protracted crisis situations. Suddenly, Hungarian foreign policy had to find answers and solutions to very complex and often historically significant, fateful issues and situations.

The *return of Hungary to the democratic community of European nations* in political, economic and security terms emerged as a *general demand* that enjoyed national consensus in the process of regime change. This implied reintegration into the community from which the Soviet occupation had forcibly separated Hungary more than four decades earlier. In terms of foreign policy, this meant that Hungary declared its intention to join the then 12-member European Communities, the predecessor of today's European Union as well as NATO, the military alliance of the North Atlantic area. Looking back from the perspective of over three decades, it can be said that Hungarian diplomacy – together with Poland – was at the forefront of both European and Atlantic integration in the region. This was also illustrated by the fact that the two countries originally included in the European PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies), set up in 1989 to help the eco-



18 On 16 December 1991, Prime Minister József Antall signs the Association Agreement between Hungary and the European Communities, the legal predecessor of the European Union, in which Hungary declares its intention to join



19 On 12 March 1999, Foreign Minister János Martonyi deposits with the Government of the United States of America the instrument of accession of Hungary to NATO, thereby making Hungary a full member of the Alliance

conomic transformation of countries liberated from Communist rule, were Poland and Hungary. Hungary, along with Czechoslovakia and Poland, was among the first countries in the region to sign an *Association Agreement* with the *European Communities* in 1991, declaring their intention to join 18, and was the first of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to present its application for membership in 1994. Hungary played a leading role in dissolving the Warsaw Pact in 1991, which became synonymous with Soviet hegemony, and was at the forefront of the rapprochement to NATO. Furthermore, Hungary was a founding member of the 'Partnership for Peace' programme, a 'precursor' to NATO membership, and was invited to enter the alliance in 1997, along with the Czechia and Poland. Members were admitted in 1999 19. At the same time, another major integration step was underway, the preparation for entry into the organization that has been called European Union since 1993. Accession negotiations started in 1998 and were successfully concluded in 2002. As the referendum held in 2003 approved accession by a large majority, Hungary became a member of the *European Union* on 1 May 2004, along with nine other countries in the region. It also became an important milestone that marked the end of the transition for Hungarian foreign policy and diplomacy that started in 1990. The country was back to the community of values to which it had belonged throughout its history and from which it could only be separated by violent acts of some foreign powers.

In the aftermath of the regime change, the entire system of Hungary's foreign relations had to be put on a new footing and adapted to the political needs of a free and democratic country. Hungary also had to respond to the very serious challenges posed by the changes in its immediate geographical environment. The scale of these challenges is illustrated by the fact that Hungary had five neighbours in 1990 and seven in 1993, but only two of them, Austria and Romania remained the same as before 1990 and five new countries appeared along Hungary's borders. With the breakup of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 14 new states emerged in Central and Eastern Europe in just two years. The transformation that then began not only created the possibility for free and democratic development in the region, but also destabilised some parts of it, as best illustrated by the tragedy of the war in former Yugoslavia. Aggressive, nationalist movements emerged that were previously unknown and that were capable of triggering latent tensions in societies and then escalating them into international conflicts. Hungary and the Hungarian society suddenly found themselves on the borderline between the zones of stability and insecurity. Hungarian foreign policy and diplomacy needed extraordinary perspicacity and



calmness, because the inappropriate handling of the conflicts that had flared up at that time could have even stalled the country's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. The system of so-called *basic treaties* played a key role in putting Hungary's international relations on a new footing from 1991. Comprehensive agreements were concluded with Italy, France, Poland, Russia and Ukraine in 1991, Germany, Spain, Greece, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Croatia in 1992, as well as with Slovakia, Moldova and Romania in 1995. The parties defined the framework, principles and main directions of cooperation in these treaties and sought to cover the full range of relations, including sensitive issues such as the ethnic Hungarians beyond the borders (with those partners with whom this was relevant).

Hungarian foreign policy reformulated the country's regional policy after 1990. Accordingly, *Central Europe* (roughly the area between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea) and Hungary have a particular interest in the security and prosperity of this region. Throughout their history, these states have been interdependent. The totalitarian regimes of the 20th century cut off the natural links of regional cooperation and imposed a framework alien to the historic traditions of these countries.

From the late 1980s, with the end of dependence from the Soviet Union, a new boom of various forms of regional cooperation emerged. In building these relations, countries mostly sought cooperation on political, security, economic, infrastructure, energy and environmental issues. Particular attention has been paid to the development of the almost non-existent north-south transport and energy corridors, which could compensate for the still perceived predominance of east-west links to former centres of great powers.

The first regional initiative that developed during the last phase of the Cold War already was the *Alps-Adriatic Working Community* (from 2013 Alps-Adriatic Alliance), established in 1978 and still in operation today. Some regions of Austria, Germany, Italy and Yugoslavia participated in this, with Vas County of Hungary joining in 1988. The first three forms of cooperation established after the change of regime were the *Central European Initiative* (CEC, 1989), the *Visegrád Cooperation* (V3, 1991) and the *Central European Free Trade Association* (CEFTA, 1992) XI.1.14. The CEC was founded in Budapest by Hungary, Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia, and was called *Quadrangle*.


In 1996, it had 16 member states already. CEFTA became the 'gateway' to EU membership in the 1990s.


One of the most successful initiatives of Hungarian foreign policy after the fall of Communism was the *Visegrád Cooperation* with Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1991 and with Slovakia after its independence 20. Over the years, the *Visegrád Four* (V4) has become an institution of mutually beneficial cooperation and effective pursuit of foreign policy interests, from which all participating states have benefited. Its strength is demonstrated by the fact that the combined voting weight of the V4 in the European Council, taking into account the 2003 Nice Treaty of the EU, equals the combined voting weight of Germany and France.

While the Budapest-based *Danube Commission*, founded in 1948, focuses mainly on the facilitation of navigation, environmental aspects have also been included in similar collaboration activities after 1990. A good example is the work of the *International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River* (ICPDR, 1994) and the *International Sava River Basin Commission* (ISRBC, 2004). Regarding the cooperation structures of Central Europe, the European Union's *Strategy for the Danube Region*, adopted in 2011 should be mentioned as well, which coordinates development policies in 11 areas to improve the region's infrastructure connections, promote environmental protection, increase prosperity and strengthen the region. Hungary has taken on a coordinating role in three areas of this strategy: with the Czechia on encouraging the use of sustainable energy, with Slovakia on restoring and preserving water quality, and with Romania on managing environmental risks.



20 Prime Minister József Antall signs the Visegrád Declaration with Czechoslovak President Václav Havel and Polish President Lech Wałęsa in Visegrád (15 February 1991)





A new level of relations with neighbouring countries was established by allowing municipalities, groups of municipalities, counties and regions to contact similar entities on the other side of the border. The regional policies of the Council of Europe and the EU have also encouraged this type of cooperation. Euroregions, the various forms of euroregional cooperation, were mainly established between counties. The first of them was the *Carpathian Euroregion*, created in 1993. After that, more than ten different formations were set up, many of which only lasting for a short time. Today, the *Carpathian Euroregion*, and the *Danube–Körös–Maros–Tisza regional cooperations* are active (XI.1.15). The form of *European groupings for territorial cooperation* (EGTC) replaced the Euroregions in 2006. EGTCs have legal personality and full legal capacity, thus they can have their own budget, assets and apply for development funds. In addition to this, there are many forms of cooperation that could be established as *UNESCO World Heritage sites*.


The third priority of Hungarian diplomacy after 1990 was the issue of *Hungarian communities living beyond the borders*. During the decades of Communism, this matter remained taboo for Hungarian foreign policy because of Soviet pressure. József Antall's statement after the first free elections in 1990 according to which he wished to be the prime minister of 15 million ethnic Hungarians spiritually, marked the beginning of a new era in this important field of Hungarian foreign policy. Not only the support of Hungarian civil organizations beyond the borders plays a key role in Hungary's national policy strategy, but also the assistance to municipalities with Hungarian majority in neighbouring countries. This is particularly manifested in the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of

so-called *twin settlement relations* between municipalities in Hungary and Hungarian local communities abroad (XI.1.16). The picture emerging on this basis shows the current state of the fabric of Hungarian national cohesion, and in the case of settlements beyond the borders, it demonstrates also the overall national embeddedness and viability of local Hungarian communities.

Achieving the above three goals required fundamental changes in the organization of Hungarian diplomacy after 1990. Hungary's *network of diplomatic and consular missions in Europe expanded significantly* (XI.1.17). The Government opened representations in the newly formed states, often taking the lead. As an example, Hungary was the first to establish diplomatic relations with the newly independent Ukraine on 3 December 1991 and to open an embassy in Kyiv on the same day. This was followed by the opening of *embassies* in Zagreb (1992), Ljubljana (1992), Chişinău (1992), Bratislava (1993), Sarajevo (1994), Minsk (2008), the Baltic countries and throughout the Balkans. In addition, consular representations have been established in regions of the Carpathian Basin with a significant Hungarian population like in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár (1997), Košice, Berehove/Beregszász, Subotica/Szabadka (2001), Osijek (2002), Miercurea Ciuc/Csikszereda (2006), Lendava/Alsóladva (2016). These *consulates-general* serve not only foreign policy goals but also national policy objectives of Hungary. The *network of Hungarian missions in Western Europe* has also expanded considerably. Embassies were opened in Dublin (1991) and Luxembourg (2003–2009), consulates general were established in Munich, Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, Lyon and Milan. Due to the strong increase in the number of Hungarian citizens working in the UK, and in order

to serve their needs more efficiently, the network of missions has also been expanded there. A consulate general was opened in Manchester, a vice consulate in Edinburgh and honorary consulates in Belfast, Cardiff, Liverpool and Torquay. The number of Hungarian diplomats serving at missions in Europe has increased significantly since 1990. In addition, an excellent network of specialised attachés has been established, especially in the field of foreign trade. Particular attention should be paid to the growth of the European network of *Hungarian cultural institutes*. Hungary had seven of them in Europe in 1990, compared to 19 in 2023. Furthermore, new Hungarian cultural institutes were opened not only in the centres of world politics, like London, Rome and Moscow, but also in the capitals of neighbouring countries, such as Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade and Bucharest. A Hungarian cultural institute was also opened in Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy, Transylvania.

The year 1990 is regarded in Hungarian diplomatic history as a major milestone, when the entire system of values and the direction of the country's foreign policy changed. However, 2010 marked another important turning point, when the government that took office in that year initiated a *change of paradigm in foreign policy*. Hungary has shifted from a follow-on foreign policy to a proactive one, both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. Hungarian proposals, motions, declarations, diplomatic visits, meetings, vetoes if necessary, to achieve foreign policy goals and to stand up for fundamental values of Hungarian foreign policy became very frequent. A major result of proactive foreign policy has been the *renewed and significant expansion of the network of Hungarian missions abroad*. In 2023, there were Hungarian embassies or non-independent





21 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán receives Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission in the former Carmelite monastery, now the Prime Minister's Office (9 May 2022)



22 Hungarian-Serbian summit with the participation of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić in Belgrade (22 April 2023)



23 Hungarian-French summit with the participation of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and President of France Emmanuel Macron in Paris (13 March 2023)

representations in every member state of the EU, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, the latter ones in Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. In addition to embassies, a dense network of Hungarian consulates general, consulates, non-independent representations and honorary consulates covers Europe, enabling the comprehensive promotion of Hungarian interests.

The Hungarian government has shifted from a conflict-averse foreign policy to a conflict-ready one. After 2010, strong advocacy of national interests became the leitmotiv of Hungarian foreign policy. This means that the representation of the values advocated by the Hungarian government has appeared in both bilateral and multilateral frameworks, without shying away from taking on conflicts, if necessary. This is particularly evident in the decision-making fora of the European Union, where Hungarian diplomacy often stands up for the national interests under serious external political pressure. The clear result is a more effective enforcement of interests. 21

Greater emphasis has been placed on the regional dimension of Hungarian foreign policy, Central Europe, the neighbouring countries, regions and the Western Balkans. The number of diplomatic contacts has increased considerably with these countries. The minister of foreign affairs and trade held a total of 60 meetings with his counterparts from neighbouring countries in 2021 and 2022. The Visegrád Cooperation has intensified enormously since 2010 and has become a very effective tool for asserting common interests. Hungarian diplomacy after 2010 has continuously sought to open a dialogue between the V4 countries and other partners. In 2017, during the Hungarian Presidency, the first V4-Israel and V4-Egypt heads of state and government meetings were held in Budapest, while the first V4-Morocco foreign ministers' meeting took place during the Hungarian Presidency in 2021. Hungary has become one of the strongest advocates for the enlargement of the European Union to include the countries of the Western Balkans. The Hungarian foreign policy supporting enlargement of the European Union has also had a positive impact on cooperation with the countries concerned. The fact that Hungarian-Serbian relations have been raised to a previously unprecedented level and that a genuine relationship of trust has been established between the two sides are a good proof for this. 22

National policy became a special focus of Hungarian diplomacy after 2010. The change of emphasis and practice is aimed at improving the living conditions of the ethnic Hungarian communities abroad, helping them to remain and prosper in their native land, strengthening their sense of national identity and their affiliations with Hungary. Since 2010, the Hungarian government has increased identity preservation funding tenfold. A good example of this is the Körösi Csoma Sándor programme, which has been very successful

in supporting ethnic Hungarians living outside the Carpathian Basin.

An unprecedented breakthrough in the field of national policy is the introduction of a preferential naturalization procedure for foreign citizens who can prove that they have Hungarian ancestry. This opportunity is available not only to ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, but also to those residing in any part of the world. The granting of Hungarian citizenship means the unification of the Hungarian nation under public law. It opens up opportunities unprecedented since the signing of the Treaty of Trianon (1920). By 31 December 2022, more than 1.15 million Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary took advantage of the opportunity provided by the law to become a Hungarian citizen.

Closely linked to national policy is the strengthening of economic cooperation and investment activity along Hungary's borders, to a large extent with areas inhabited by Hungarians beyond the borders. The political consideration is that successful joint investments with neighbouring countries provide a good basis for cooperation based on mutual respect and appreciation. Furthermore, the resulting improvement in the diplomatic climate will also enhance and strengthen the position of the Hungarian communities living in the neighbouring countries.

The post-2010 period is an era of crises. Hungary's relations with European states have been affected by new types of tensions, crises and threats, unlike anything experienced before. This was the case with the migrant crisis that unfolded in 2015, or the handling of the pandemic that started in 2020. Hungarian politics and diplomacy stood its ground in these cases, too. The migration crisis, in particular, has required measures to protect Hungary's interests, which have caused significant tensions in the European relations of the country. However, time has proven the correctness of the Hungarian position in every case. The steps taken by the Hungarian government were followed 'in silence' by precisely those governments which had been the most vocal critics of the Hungarian measures. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 poses a long-term challenge for Hungarian diplomacy, as it will have unforeseeable and unpredictable consequences in the fields of foreign and security policy as well as economic, energy security and many other areas of cooperation. 23

Building a system of political and economic links with the newly emerged states of the Eastern European region under new political circumstances was of particular importance in Hungary's European foreign policy after 1990. The four states of the region – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova – have been a priority area of Hungarian foreign policy and diplomacy since the early 1990s. Hungary signed a basic treaty with both Russia and Ukraine in 1991 and established dip-


lomatic relations with all of the four states immediately after their independence. The Embassy in Moscow was given a new mandate, while the consulate general in Kyiv, opened in 1969, was upgraded to an embassy. The Hungarian Embassy in Chişinău, the capital of Moldova, was opened in the same year that diplomatic relations were established. Diplomatic relations were also established with Belarus, while in 2008 a Hungarian embassy was opened in Minsk, followed by an honorary consulate general in Brest.

Ukraine takes a special position in Hungary's external relations, also because of ethnic Hungarians living in Zakarpattia. This is one of the reasons why a consulate general was opened in Uzhhorod and a consulate in Berehove/Beregszász. Representing Hungarian interests related to national policy and maintaining contacts with the local ethnic Hungarian community are among the most important tasks of those missions. In addition to these missions, Hungary operates honorary consulates in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Luhansk and Ternopil.

The network of Hungarian missions in Russia has also expanded remarkably. Besides the embassy in Moscow and the consulate general in Saint Petersburg, there are also Hungarian consulates general in Ekaterinburg and Kazan, as well as an honorary consulate in Chelyabinsk. A Hungarian cultural institute has been operating in Moscow since 1990. All four states in the region send scholarship holders under Hungary's Stipendium Hungaricum programme, with 200 students from Russia, 100 from Ukraine, 50 from Belarus and 40 from Moldova in academic year 2022/23.

Russia has gradually become a special partner to Hungary since the early 2000s. This is demonstrated not only by the extraordinary number of high-level diplomatic visits, especially since 2010, but also by the joint implementation of strategically important projects such as the construction of two new units of Paks Nuclear Power Plant or the joint production of 1,300 railway carriages for the Egyptian National Railways, jointly financed by the Hungarian Eximbank and its Russian partner.

Unfortunately, Hungary's relations with Ukraine have changed in the opposite direction over the past 30 years. Very soon after the collapse of Communism, the two countries established close cooperation. This was greatly supported by the fact that the newly independent Ukraine treated the ethnic Hungarian community in Zakarpattia in an exemplary manner. The close cooperation that developed then served the interests of both countries. However, this process was interrupted after the political changes that took place in Ukraine in 2014. The increasing pressure from the Ukrainian government on the Hungarian community – and other national minorities – and the increasingly harsh provocations of nationalist groups tolerated by the author-



ities gradually made it impossible to develop or keep relation at the same level. Sad milestones in this process were the Ukrainian Education Law of 2017, the Language Law of 2019 and the Secondary Education Law of 2020. Those laws have severely reduced the previously acquired rights of the Hungarian and other minorities living in Ukraine and grossly violated international agreements on the protection of minorities.

Examining the operating framework of Hungarian diplomacy, it can be concluded that the system of training and recruitment of the Hungarian diplomatic corps was radically transformed after the regime change. In the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of Hungarian diplomats were trained in Moscow, whereas from the 1990s onwards, prestigious Western institutions such as the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (Sciences Po) gained prominence. Furthermore, as in the pre-1990 period, many Hungarian diplomats graduated in international relations from the Budapest University of Economics (now Corvinus University of Budapest). The Hungarian Diplomatic Academy was launched in 2020 under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, offering high quality theoretical and practical training to young people interested in a career in foreign affairs.

The Arab world and Israel

Hungary's relations with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa began to take a new shape in the second half of the 1980s, even before the regime change. The previous cooperation, typically based on



24 Opening ceremony of the 2nd Hungarian-Arab Business Forum in Riyadh with the participation of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Saudi Deputy Prime Minister Muqrin bin Abdul-Aziz (23-25 March 2014)

ties defined by the Soviet Union, was gradually replaced by a reorientation of relations towards the Atlantic. One of the first and perhaps the most significant signs of this trend was the development of cooperation with Israel in 1988 and the opening of Hungary's embassy in Tel Aviv in 1989. This process gained new momentum and new directions with the regime change (XI. 1. 18.). Hungary established diplomatic relations with those Gulf Arab states that had previously been reluctant to do so because of their opposition to the Soviet bloc, namely the United Arab Emirates in 1989, followed by Bahrain, Oman and Qatar in 1990, and finally Saudi Arabia in 1995.

The Hungarian government sent a resident ambassador to Saudi Arabia 24 in 1996, to Qatar in 2003, to the United Arab Emirates in 2004 and to Oman in 2019. The relatively extensive network of missions did not shrink even during the period of regime change. Therefore, Hungary had one of the most comprehensive links in the region among the members of the former Soviet bloc even in the 1990s. Hungary was the only country in Europe to maintain a diplomatic presence in civil war-torn Libya, although its embassy staff had to be evacuated to neighbouring Tunisia in some cases. The Hungarian embassy in Damascus was closed in 2012, due to the suspension of diplomatic relations, but reopened in 2020 at the level of chargé d'affaires. The embassy in Baghdad was suspended in 2005 for security reasons but reopened in 2013. The number of diplomatic staff in embassies, especially those specialised in foreign trade, declined in most



25 Meeting between Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt in Cairo (31 May 2016)

missions after the regime change. Hungarian diplomacy sought to compensate for this to some extent by appointing honorary consuls in those states where local rules allowed it. Prime minister József Antall and president Árpád Göncz visited most of the major states in the region and sought to lay the foundations for political cooperation with the renewed, democratic Hungary. Despite all these efforts, the absence of Hungarian companies and the end of scholarships provided by the Hungarian government had a lasting negative impact on the development of relations. The consequence was that Hungary's cooperation with the countries of the Arab region stagnated and then declined from the second half of the 1990s. This was also clearly reflected in a decrease in the number of high-level visits during that period. The decisive change came with the launch of the policy of opening towards the East and then towards the South, as well as a series of practical measures taken after 2010. 25 The government gradually sent commercial attachés to all Hungarian embassies, bringing the number of diplomats in many embassies up to, and in some cases even exceeding the pre-1990 level. A system of re-accreditation of certain specialised diplomats was also introduced in the region. For example, the activities of the scientific and technical attaché of the Hungarian embassy in Paris have been extended to Morocco as well. In line with this policy, the Hungarian consulate general in Erbil, Iraq, was opened in 2014, and the Cairo embassy's office in Khartoum – as a non-independent mission – in 2018. The Jerusalem office of the Hungarian embassy in Tel Aviv was established in 2019. The launch of the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship programme in the mid-2010s met with a very positive reception by Hungary's partners in the region and gave a new impetus to the development of relations. The total number of countries in the region totalled 1,710 per year in early 2023. Diplomatic contacts reached an unprecedented level of intensity, as clearly demonstrated by the very significant increase in the number of high-level visits after 2010. It is striking that this applies not only to those countries that are considered to be Hungary's traditional partners, but also to those where Hungarian political leaders and public officials had not visited before, or only rarely. It can be concluded



that Hungary's diplomatic presence in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa region in the early 2020s corresponds to its needs, interests and international weight.

Sub-Saharan Africa

During the decades of the Cold War, Hungary's cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa was primarily based on ideological considerations. Prior to the regime change, in the mid-1980s, there were already nine Hungarian embassies in the states of the region, with an extensive network of accreditation. Building cooperation was supported by a strong presence of Hungarian companies and scholarship programme funded by the government. However, these links had already begun to loosen even before the regime change, as was indicated by the closure of the embassy in Accra in 1987. The process of closing missions accelerated after 1990, until only two Hungarian embassies remained in the entire region by 2012, namely in Nairobi and Pretoria. After the announcement of the policy of global and then southern opening in 2013, the Hungarian government first appointed roving ambassadors to several countries in the region, then reopened the embassy in Abuja in 2013, while the missions in Accra, Addis Ababa and Luanda resumed their operations in 2016. The same year, a commercial office was established in Lagos, Nigeria. The reopening of the Hungarian embassy in Addis Ababa was particularly important because the Ethiopian capital hosts the headquarters of the African Union, the continent's most important integration organization whose international role grows steadily.

The Hungarian diplomatic presence in Sub-Saharan

Africa has been strengthened with new types of missions from 2019 (XI. 1. 19.). A non-independent representation office was then established in Kampala (Uganda) under the auspices of the embassy in Nairobi, another one in Lusaka (Zambia) in 2021, attached to the embassy in Pretoria while a third one was opened in Dakar (Senegal) the same year under the supervision of the embassy in Accra. A new office of the embassy in Accra was opened in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) in 2022. Hungarian diplomacy has thus covered more countries in the region with resident or accredited missions than ever before. In addition, the network of honorary consulates has been constantly expanding. Among others, honorary consulates have been opened in Côte d'Ivoire, the Republic of South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Cabo Verde.

Diplomatic contacts with the countries of the Sub-Saharan region have increased significantly, especially at the level of foreign ministers. From 2014 to 2022, Hun-



26 János Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission at the first Budapest Africa Forum (6 June 2013)



27 President Ferenc Mád, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko in Budapest (16 July 2002)

gary's minister of foreign affairs and trade visited nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa on 12 occasions and held 40 meetings with representatives of 23 countries on the margins of various multilateral events. The increased attention of Hungarian foreign policy towards Africa is also reflected in the fact that an Africa Forum was held in Budapest in 2013, 2015 and 2018 with hundreds of key political figures, business leaders and experts invited. 26 As a member state of the European Union, Hungary also participates in EU operations to strengthen security in Sub-Saharan Africa (20 staff in Mali in 2022). In addition, Hungarian soldiers are also present in Mali as part of the French-led Takuba Task Force.

Development aid is playing an increasingly important role in Hungary's relations with the region, with EUR 19.51 million for 101 projects in 2020. These funds were mainly allocated to cooperation in education (EUR 17 million), the digitalization of the tourism sector (EUR 909 thousand), the development of social infrastructure (EUR 555.28 thousand) and health (EUR 424 thousand). Under the Hungary Helps programme, the Sub-Saharan region received USD 10.8 million in humanitarian aid between 2018 and 2022. In 2021, Hungary funded 33 projects worth USD 3.4 million in 16 countries. Moreover, the Stipendium Hungaricum programme is also an important tool for strengthening cooperation, with a total of 795 scholarships in 18 countries of the region offered by Hungary in early 2023.

The Hungarian government's resolution on the *Africa Strategy*, adopted in April 2019, aims to put Hungary's foreign policy and economic presence on the African continent on a new footing, and foresees the further strengthening of cooperation with the countries of the region. The increased focus of Hungarian diplomacy on Africa is particularly appropriate in light of the creation of the *African Continental Free Trade Area* on 1 January 2021, covering 1.3 billion people and USD 3,400 billion in trade.

Asia and the Pacific Region

Compared to other geographic areas, Hungarian diplomacy has traditionally had a strong presence in the Asia-Pacific region bordered by Turkey, Japan and Australia. This is clearly reflected in the timing of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of embassies, especially in the key states of the continent. There are three countries in the area with which Hungary established diplomatic relations in the inter-war period: Japan (1921), Turkey (1924) and Iran (1937). The Hungarian network of 15 embassies and 3 consulates general at the beginning of 1989 did not undergo significant modifications following the regime change.

27 Assuming diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea in 1989 and opening an embassy in Seoul the same year was a symbolic act and a sign of ending the Cold War (XI. 1. 20.).

Paradoxically, the biggest decline in the number of Hungarian missions occurred in the years after Hungary's accession to the EU. The government of that time closed five missions between 2004 and 2009 (Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Kuala Lumpur, Sydney and Ulaanbaatar) in a region that was becoming increasingly important in the scheme of global relations. Among the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Hungary opened an embassy in Kazakhstan (Almaty) in 1992, while the Caucasus republics appeared on the map of Hungarian diplomacy more than a decade and a half later, with embassies in Tbilisi (Georgia) in 2008 and Baku (Azerbaijan) in 2009. Among the countries in the region, Australia and New Zealand have a significant Hungarian diaspora. A Hungarian embassy was opened in Canberra in 1975 and in Wellington in 1919. The most visible expansion of the Hungarian diplomatic network took place in China: the consulate general in Shanghai, closed in 1990, was reopened in 2004, followed by Chongqing (2010) and Guangzhou (2021) and the reopening of the consulate general in Hong Kong, which opened in 1999 but closed in 2009.

The introduction of the policy of global opening, followed by the opening towards the East and the South in the early 2010s also brought changes in the network of Hungarian missions. In Central Asia, embassies were established in Tashkent (2017) and Bishkek (2020). This brings the number of Hungarian missions in Central Asia to four, including the consulate general in Almaty that was opened in 2008 after the embassy



28 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán pays a state visit to Beijing (12 February 2014)




29 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán receives South Korean Head of State Moon Jae-in in Budapest (3 November 2021)

there had been moved to Astana, Kazakhstan's new capital. The previously closed embassies in Ulaanbaatar and Kuala Lumpur reopened in 2015. The network of non-independent missions also expanded in Asia. The Phnom Penh office, operating as part of the Hungarian embassy in Hanoi, opened in Cambodia in 2019 and takes on duties related to consular protection from 2020. The Vientiane office, which is part of the Bangkok embassy, opened in Laos in 2019 and also handles consular matters. The Dhaka office opened in 2022 and operates under the Hungarian embassy in New Delhi as a non-independent mission. There were 34 Hungarian honorary consular missions in the whole region in 2023.

The circle of accreditation of Hungarian ambassadors is constantly expanding, especially in the Pacific region.

The relevance of Pacific island states in global politics has grown steadily in recent years, particularly with regard to trade and economic aspects, as well as the security challenges posed by climate change and their engagement in climate negotiations. According to these criteria, the accreditation of Hungarian heads of mission in these countries became politically appropriate. While until 2018, Hungary only accredited ambassadors to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Palau, Samoa and Tonga, the decision was taken in 2019 to accredit the ambassador in Canberra to the Solomon Islands and, following the establishment of diplomatic relations, the ambassador in Manila to the Marshall Islands. It was also decided in 2021 to extend the accreditation of the Hungarian ambassador in Canberra to Vanuatu, the ambassador in Wellington to Tuvalu and the Re-





30 Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, together with Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, inaugurates the Hungarian Embassy in Tashkent (27 June 2017)

public of Kiribati, and the ambassador in Manila to Nauru and the Federated States of Micronesia. Hungary closed its embassy in Kabul in 2014, and as of 2021, Hungary is represented in Afghanistan by its ambassador in Islamabad.

Since the regime change, Hungarian political leaders have frequently visited the countries of the region. The intensity of high-level contacts has particularly increased since the beginning of the 2010s. In terms of the number of visits by heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers, some countries in the region are priority targets (Japan, China, Korea, Turkey) [28] [29], while co-operation has also increased with countries where there was little Hungarian diplomatic activity before (e.g. Central Asia). [30]

Since joining the EU in 2004, Hungary has been an active participant in the *Asia–Europe Meeting* (ASEM), the most comprehensive forum for informal political dialogue between Europe and Asia. In 2011, the town of Gödöllő hosted the 10th ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting, organized by the Hungarian Presidency of the EU. Hungary was represented by prime minister Viktor Orbán at the 12th ASEM Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Brussels in 2018. Due to the pandemic, the 13th ASEM Summit of Heads of State and Government was held in the form of a video conference in 2021, to which Péter Szijjártó, minister of foreign affairs and trade, sent a video message on behalf of prime minister Viktor Orbán. Until the end of 2022, Hungary organized 12 ASEM programmes, most recently the 5th ASEM Transport Ministers' Meeting (ASEM TMM5) in 2019.

When Hungary joined the EU in 2004, it also became a member of the *Asia–Europe Foundation* (ASEF), which covers social, cultural, educational and scientific cooperation. According to ASEF's records, more than 80 Hungarian participants were involved in cultural, professional, student exchange and other training programmes organised by ASEF by the end of 2021. Besides ASEM and ASEF, Hungary also plays an active role in several sub-regional cooperation fora across the continent, such as the Turkic Council or the One Belt, One Road programme initiated by China. Hungary is also one of the driving forces behind the 16+1 (from 2022 14+1) cooperation between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Tied aid lending is becoming increasingly important in developing cooperation with many Asian countries. A particularly successful example of this is the tied aid loan programme signed with Laos in 2016, which improved the institutions and legal infrastructure of the Lao food chain safety system and carried out a historic modernization of the Lao laboratory system, such as the complete modernisation of the national vaccine plant. Another important means of building



relations in the Asia–Pacific region is the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need. An example is a donation of EUR 45,000 to the Archdiocese of Dhaka under the Hungary Helps Programme in 2020. This was used to build 20 light-frame houses in the outskirts of the capital for disadvantaged Christian families who were internally displaced. In order to help Rohingya (a mostly Muslim minority in Myanmar) refugees, the Hungary Helps Agency funded a EUR 11,000 health project of Malteser International's local partner organization in southern Bangladesh.

Hungarian cultural diplomacy and cultural presence – outside Europe – is the strongest in the Asia–Pacific region. The continent's first Hungarian cultural institute opened in New Delhi in 1978. Following the launch of the global opening, new Hungarian cultural institutes were established in Istanbul and Beijing in 2013 as well as in Tokyo and Seoul in 2019. The Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship programme is also very pop-

ular among partners in Asia. In this framework, Hungary offered a total of 2,905 scholarships for full-time education to countries in the Asia and Pacific region in the academic year 2022/23. The high interest is shown by the fact that a total of 24,808 students applied for the 2,905 places. Sri Lanka became a new partner in 2022, with 20 scholarships offered by the Government of Hungary.

The Americas

Relations between Hungary and the Americas go back centuries, primarily because of the long-established Hungarian diaspora communities in many countries. During the decades of the Cold War, however, it was not possible to develop cooperation with the countries of the continent. The only exceptions were certain countries of Latin America, with which ideologically based relations were built.

After the first free elections in 1990, a transforma-



31 US President George Bush receives Prime Minister József Antall in a private meeting in the Oval Office of the White House (18 October 1990)

tion of relations began immediately, especially in *North America*, as Euro-Atlantic integration became a key objective of Hungarian foreign policy. Regarding the network of missions, these efforts are well reflected in the opening of the Hungarian consulate general in Los Angeles (1992), the rapid and steady increase in the number of diplomatic staff posted in North America as well as the construction of the network of honorary consuls. Diplomatic relations with the USA and Canada reached a new level when Hungary joined NATO in 1999. This change was also clearly reflected in the composition of diplomatic staff in Hungarian embassies there. The network of Hungarian missions in these two countries has been steadily expanding and enriching since the regime change [X. 1. 21].

In *Canada*, the consulate general in Montreal, which was open from 1948 to 1950 and from 1982 to 2006, has been operating since 2021. The consulate general in Toronto, established in 1992 and closed in 2009, reopened in 2014. Besides that, a new consulate opened in Vancouver in 2019. In addition, five Hungarian honorary consulates were operating in Canada in 2022, namely in Calgary, Edmonton, Hammonds Plains, Regina and Winnipeg.

A similarly dynamic development can be observed with regard to Hungarian missions in the USA. While there were two (in some periods only one) of them during the decades of the Cold War, i.e. the embassy in Washington and the consulate general in New York, the number of representations increased to seven by the beginning of 2023, including the Hungarian cultural institute in New York opened in 2001. The consulate general in Chicago, which was established in 2007 and closed in 2009, was reopened in 2015. The consulate general in Los Angeles has been operating since 1992 and there are vice consulates in Houston and Miami since 2019. The number of Hungarian honorary consular missions increased to 18 by 2022, covering almost the entire territory of the USA (Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Charlotte, Daytona Beach, Denver,



32 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, pays an official visit to Budapest (22 June 2006)

Hamden, Honolulu, Mayaguez, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Portland, Sacramento, Saint Louis, Saint Louis Park, Salt Lake City, Sarasota, Seattle).

The distinguished relations with the USA and Canada are reflected in the huge number of high-level visits from Hungary since 1990. Hungarian heads of state have made 11 official visits to the two countries, heads of government five, while foreign ministers 32 until 2022. The historic visit by prime minister József Antall to US president George Bush Sr. [31] in October 1990, immediately after the regime change, deserves a special highlight. Top-level contacts between the leaderships of the two countries became regular after Hungary's accession to NATO, as a formal alliance was established between the two countries. [32]

The network of Hungarian missions in *Latin America and the Caribbean* has undergone continuous and significant changes since the early 1990s, reflecting the priorities and budgetary margins of the Hungarian governments of the time. Since the launch of the policy of global and then southern opening in the early 2010s, the main trend in this geographical region has been towards development and enlargement, as well as strengthening the system of missions. As a result, the Hungarian diplomatic presence in the region has increased significantly. Hungarian embassies were opened in Santiago de Chile (Chile) in 2014, Quito (Ecuador) in 2015, Bogotá (Colombia) and Lima (Peru) in 2017, and a consulate general in São Paulo (Brazil) in 2015. In addition, non-independent missions were established in Montevideo (Uruguay) and Panama City (Panama) in 2018; the former one is under the supervision of the embassy in Buenos Aires, while the latter one is attached to Bogotá. The network of honorary consulates has also been expanded. Honorary consulates were established in Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), Managua (Nicaragua), Jaraguá do Sul (Brazil), Manaus, Villa Ángela (Argentina), Barranquilla (Colombia), as well as in Guadalajara, Monterrey, Cancún and Chihuahua (Mexico).

Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were Hungary's main trading partners in the region in 2021. With growing export performance, these countries accounted for nearly 77% of Hungarian exports to the region. [33] Of particular importance for relations with the region is the observer status that Hungary assumed in the *Pacific Alliance* (Alianza del Pacífico – AdP) in 2015, established by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. As an expression of willingness to cooperate, Hungary offers each of the four member states two scholarships annually in water-related fields from 2015. Since 2020, Hungary has also had observer status in the Madrid-based international organization *Secretaría General Iberoamericana* (SEGIB) that includes 22 Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries.

Hungary renewed its relations with the Portuguese-speaking (Luzophone) countries as well. As part of



33 Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó pays an official visit to Mexico (20 January 2023)



34 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán with Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and his wife at the inauguration ceremony of the new head of state in Brasília (1 January 2019)

this effort, it joined the *Community of Portuguese Language Countries* (CPLP) as an associate observer in 2016 and established a strategic partnership with Brazil. The Government of Hungary adopted a strategy in 2019 to put Hungarian–Brazilian foreign policy and foreign economic relations on a new footing. This decision was based on ideological affinities with the Brazilian government that took office at the time; its overall aim was to renew and revitalise bilateral relations. [34] As part of the policy of global opening, the first Hungary–Latin America Forum was held in Budapest in 2012, followed by similar events in 2015, 2017 and 2019 with hundreds of leading politicians, business people and experts.

The regular summits between the EU and the *Community of Latin American and Caribbean States* (CELAC) are the highest level of contact between the two integration organizations. From the Hungarian side, the minister of foreign affairs and trade participated in the EU–CELAC meetings in 2015, 2016 and 2022, and held a number of bilateral meetings.

The *Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship programme* is also very popular among Hungary's Latin American partners. Hungary offered a total of 570 scholarships for full-time studies for Latin American and Caribbean students in the academic year 2022/23. The high interest is reflected in the fact that in total 1053 applicants applied for 570 places. Hungary is increasingly engaged in development and humanitarian cooperation with the Latin American region, especially in view of the protracted crisis in Venezuela and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Hungary donated 20,000 Boostrix vaccines (for children) to Ecuador in 2021. In January 2022, 150,000 doses of AstraZeneca vaccines were sent to Quito. Ecuador hosted a virtual conference in 2021 aiming at the support of Venezuelan refugees. Hungary donated 100,000 medical masks, which the embassy in Quito delivered to UNICEF. Hungary provided medical and humanitarian food aid to the Hungarian community in Venezuela several times, and donated a mobile health station to Colombia to support refugees from Venezuela. Hungary offered a water purification container for the reconstruction work following a devastating natural disaster (El Niño phenomenon) that hit Peru in early 2017.

Considering the significant size of the *Hungarian diaspora* in the Americas (around 1.6 million Hungarians live in the USA and Canada and 54,000 in Latin America, mainly in Argentina), the Julianus Programme (2012), the Körösi Csoma Programme (2013) and the Mikes Kelemen Programme (2013), launched by the Government of Hungary in the early 2010s, are important here, too. They serve the Hungarian diaspora by cultivating their Hungarian identity and preserving the values that were created by Hungarian emigrants.

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Revised by

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English translation by

Andrew Gane, Péter Kveck, Roland József Balogh

English translation revised by

Andrew Gane, Gábor Gercsák

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Ildikó Kuti – Civertan Bt.

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Authors

IVÁN BÁBA
JÁNOS BÁRTH M.
ZSOMBOR BARTOS-ELEKES
JÓZSEF BENEDEK
KRISZTINA BICZÓ
ÁDÁM BOLLÓK
LAJOS BOROS
BALÁZS BORSOS
LÁSZLÓ BUGA
GÁBOR CSÜLLÖG
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MLADEN KLEMENČIĆ
KÁROLY KOCSIS
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SZABOLCS MÁTYÁS
TÜNDE MORVAI
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LÁSZLÓ VÁRKONYI
NÁNDOR ZAGYI
LÁSZLÓ ZENTAI

Authors of maps and figures

†JENŐ BARABÁS
JÁNOS BÁRTH M.
JÓZSEF BENEDEK
ZOLTÁN BERTUS
KRISZTINA BICZÓ
ÁDÁM BOLLÓK
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BALÁZS BORSOS
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FERENC GYŐRI
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†IMRE HARKAI
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JÁNOS HONVÁRI
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LÁSZLÓ HUBAI
ANNAMÁRIA JANKÓ
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†ISTVÁN KNIEZSA
KÁROLY KOCSIS
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BALÁZS KOMORÓCZY
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ZOLTÁN KOVÁCS
TAMÁS KOVALCSIK
†MÁRIA KRESZ
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GABRIELLA KULCSÁR
PÉTER KVECK
†GYÖRGY MARTIN
TIBOR MARTON
ZSÓFIA MASEK

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TÜNDE MORVAI
†IVÁN NAGY
ISTVÁN ÖRDÖG
ILONA PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS
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ILDIKÓ VADÁL
ANDRÁSNÉ VÁNDOR
LÁSZLÓ VÁRKONYI
NÁNDOR ZAGYI

Chief cartographers

FANNI KOCSÓ
ANIKÓ KOVÁCS
GÁSPÁR MEZEI
ZSOMBOR NEMERKÉNYI

Technical staff

MARGIT LACZKÓ
ÁRPÁD MAGYAR